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COMMENT: SEPARATION AND SCHOOLS
Kent Greenawalt*

In commenting on these rich papers by Michel Troper1 and
Michael McConnell,2 I first analyze the implications of legal and
political theory for religious liberty and separation of church and
state. I then turn to underlying premises of modern liberal theory
about moral education and tolerance among citizens. Lastly, I
concentrate on separation as it affects the schooling of children.
Despite Professor Troper's emphasis on the uniqueness of French
understanding and history,3 I was struck by how closely French
problems about schooling, and their possible resolutions, resemble
those in the United States.
I. POLITICAL THEORY AND CHURCH AND STATE
Professor Troper presents a complex set of definitions and
categorizations of a sort not often found in Anglo-American legal
scholarship. This powerful example of French conceptualization
can lead an American reader into confusion if he is not careful.
Troper moves from a theory of the state, or sovereignty, to
political theory, concluding that church-state separation is merely
a "policy" or "ideology." Such a theory of the state is too
dogmatic about possibilities; even if it were accurate in full,
church-state separation would not necessarily rank as merely a
"policy" or 'ideology," as those terms are understood in English.
According to Troper:
[L]aw-by which is meant the law of the State-is a normcreating order that regulates the totality of human conduct in
such a way that there is no behavior that is not commanded,
forbidden, permitted or legislated by a legal norm. And there is
no legitimate authority that is not exercised by virtue of a legal
norm created by the State. Sociologists say the same thing
when they define the State as the political authority possessing

• University Professor, Columbia University School of Law.
1 Michel Troper, French Secularism, or Lai:cite, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1267 (2000).
2 Michael W. McConnell, Why Is Religious Liberty the "First Freedom"?, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 1243 (2000).
3 See Troper, supra note 1, at 1268-76.
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a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. 4

Thus a modem state "always governs religious conduct because
the State commands it or at least permits it." 5
This sweeping notion of the authority of a state was familiar
during the nineteenth century, but it seems strangely out of place
as we enter the twenty-first century. International law sets a
variety of limits on what national governments may authorize.
They cannot authorize piracy, slavery, or genocide, and, under the
United Nations Charter and other international treaties that may
bind even nonsignatories, perhaps states may not restrict religious
liberty in very drastic ways. If national governments contravene
these norms, they commit violations of law according to
international standards.6
Another possibility Troper does not address is a constitution
with unamendable features. A nation-state may adopt a written
constitution that forbids any legal authority from authorizing
certain behavior. Troper can, of course, say that, in such a state,
the unamendable rule has its authority because it is contained in
the state's constitution; but if a country has an unamendable
constitution providing for religious liberty or church-state
separation, no existing organ of government, or combination of
organs, may legally take away what the constitution provides. In
the United States, according to current dominant theory, the
combination of bodies that can amend the Constitution could
eliminate religious liberty and church-state separation. Given the
difficulty of amendment, and shared understandings about central
aspects of religious liberty and about the division of
responsibilities between government and religious organizations,
the legal formality that religious freedom could be eliminated has
little reality for our social life.
Let us grant, for the sake of argument, that according to a
proper theory of legal authority, separation of church and state
and religious liberty exist at the sufferance of a national
government that could eliminate them. Does it follow that churchstate separation is merely a "policy" or "ideology," to be
compared with other policies or ideologies?7 If anything that the
state "grants" becomes merely a "policy" or "ideology," then, on
4

Id. at 1270.
Id. From another point of view, Troper says the modern state must have a
separation of church and state, because such a state does not arise until political authority
is secularized.
6 Troper might respond that according to the law of a particular nation-state,
authorities could authorize such violations. That depends on what view of international
legal obligations the law of any nation-state adopts.
7
See Troper, supra note 1, at 1271.
5
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Troper's understanding, the principles that we should not have
slavery and genocide, and murder and rape, are also "policies" or
"ideologies."8 If any claims of fundamental rights can rise beyond
being merely ideologies, then it is arguable that religious liberty
and aspects of church-state separation might do so. That is, if one
can reasonably believe that opposition to genocide and murder
rises above "policy," then one might find convincing arguments
that opposition to religious persecution also rises above policy.
Whether fundamental human rights, and other aspects of state
responsibilities, rest on anything more objective or secure than
prevailing beliefs or shifting attitudes about desirable political
arrangements is a subject of deep analysis and intense discussion.
That issue certainly cannot be settled by a theory of the state that
grants the state comprehensive legal authority.
As Michael McConnell explains, the dominant social
philosophy in the United States has been that individuals have
prepolitical moral rights of various kinds, and that the justification
of the state lies in the protection of these rights. 9 Whatever may be
sound theory about the law and the state, members of a society
may consistently embrace a political philosophy in which
individual rights are crucial and thought to be more securely
rooted than in "policy." French theorists have emphasized the
ancient idea of the public freedom of a combined citizenry, but my
reading suggests that ideas of individual rights have also exerted a
substantial influence in France, as well as in the United States and
elsewhere. I should be very surprised if some French authors have
not viewed a secular state as an important component of individual
religious liberty. In any event, the most vital questions about the
proper grounding of church-state separation are not resolvable
either by theories about state power or by references to how the
dominant tradition in one country has viewed the subject.
II.

LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, CHURCH-STATE SEPARATION,
MORALEDUCATION, AND TOLERANCE

Professor McConnell writes of a "two-kingdoms" theology of
liberty of conscience and "competing authorities" of church and
government that lies "at the heart of our First Amendment." 10
McConnell goes on to suggest that America made an unusual and
risky choice to leave religious belief and practice, and moral

8

I confess uncertainty as to how far these terms carry for Professor Troper some of
the connotations they have for Americans.
9
See McConnell, supra note 2, at 1264.
10 Id. at 1246.
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education, to nongovernmental institutions.11
He expresses
concern about a shift from the view that the government should be
tolerant and egalitarian to a more modem notion that citizens
should also exhibit these qualities in their private associations. 12
I agree with a great deal in McConnell's illuminating account,
but I believe that he greatly overstates the extent to which the
country has been committed to the withdrawal of the state from
moral education. And further, he oversimplifies the requisites
necessary to sustain liberal democracy when he contrasts
government attitudes and the attitudes of private citizens. Before
I undertake those two topics, I make two less important criticisms
about the "two-kingdoms" theology and the implications of a
principle of liberty of conscience.
McConnell's treatment of a "two-kingdoms" theology of
liberty of religious conscience claims a greater continuity between
older and modern conceptions than is warranted. In the ancient
Catholic tradition and in the original Calvinist understanding, the
"two kingdoms" of church and state had separate functions but
cooperated to achieve a set of unified objectives. The notion of
separate, possibly competing, authorities, with religious truth
being no business of the state, is more modern. That "twokingdoms" view, which McConnell says lies "at the heart of our
First Amendment," 13 is not to be found in fifth century papal
teachings, or in those of Luther, Calvin, or the early Puritans.
McConnell apparently embraces the proposition that if
coerced faith is unacceptable to God, it follows that the
government should not promote any religious truth. 14 But a
principle of uncoerced conscience does not alone lead to the
government's refraining from teaching what it believes to be the
true religion. So long as people are free to dissent, government
teaching need not coerce.15 A child is no more coerced to
particular religious views if the government weakly sponsors the
views than if her parents teach them and bring her, for fifteen
years, to religious services in which these views are expressed to
the exclusion of all others. There are powerful reasons for
government not to teach religion, but such teaching, by itself, does
not straightforwardly coerce conscience.
I now move from these two minor quibbles to matters that are
11

See id. at 1261.
See id. at 1259.
13
Id. at 1246.
14 See id. at 1250.
15 Indeed, even the government's silencing of public expression of false views might be
justified as a way to remove clearly erroneous views from the field, so long as individuals
are allowed to believe and practice as they are inclined to do.
12
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much more important for a modem understanding of liberal
democracy. In combination, Professors Troper and McConnell
convey a somewhat misleading impression about dominant
American theories concerning the state's responsibility for the
teaching of morality. McConnell pointedly notes the choice at our
country's founding to remove religion from government, despite a
widespread belief that religious belief and practice was a crucial
component of public virtue. McConnell indicates that our society,
unlike almost every preceding one in human history, did not
"concern itself with the moral and religious upbringing of its
citizens. "16 This way of putting our political philosophy fits
Professor Troper's fourth model of secularism: "The Refusal to
Propagate Values." 17 Troper thinks this model, according to which
the state "must not be 'the bearer of a conception of the common
good,"' 18 fits the United States reasonably well. Both Troper and
McConnell suggest an understanding about the government's
withdrawal from promoting values that is more extreme than that
which anyone actually defends.
Among those who think about these matters, theorists are
divided between those who think a liberal state should be neutral
between conceptions of the good life and those who reject this
counsel of neutrality. A great majority of both groups believes
that public, state-supported education should continue, though
many join McConnell in believing that greater competition from
private alternatives would be healthy. No one thinks that the state
should have nothing to do with moral education; no one thinks
that public schools should steer entirely clear of moral education.
Morality is not fully encompassed by conceptions of the good life.
Morality includes principles of equality and mutual respect for
others as citizens-the underpinnings of a just social order. No
one thinks that the government should avoid teaching these aspects
of morality.
Further, even among the theorists who argue that the state
should, for adults, be neutral among conceptions of the good life,
many accept public schools taking positions about some of these
subjects.19 For example, they may believe schools should
encourage students to think that appreciation of art and music, or
16

McConnell, supra note 2, at 1253.
Troper, supra note 1, at 1283.
18 Id.
19 I do not claim that the line between aspects of justice and conceptions of the good
life is clear. One need not worry too much about the line in connection with schools,
because the position that schools should avoid all issues of "the good life" is close to
absurd. I draw the distinction to emphasize that no one thinks that either public schools,
or the government more generally, should be value neutral across the board.
17
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hard work, are aspects of a life well lived. Troper's fourth model
of secularism does not reflect American attitudes. These attitudes
are much more accurately captured by his third model, in which
the state promotes secular values20 (with many Americans favoring
a closer connection of religion and government than that model
envisions).
Professor McConnell draws an important distinction between
government perspectives and those of private citizens. He writes
of a shift from a view that the government should be neutral,
tolerant, and egalitarian to a view that we should all exhibit these
qualities in our private associations. 21 Speaking from powerful
religious belief, he complains that "the ideal of the liberal citizen
thus conflicts with the ideal believer in religion or any other
comprehensive faith or ideology." 22 But McConnell fails to draw a
crucial line between one's personal respect for others as equal
citizens-entitled to participate in the political process and have
their positions taken seriously-and one's respect for religious and
other understandings about life that one is convinced are shot
through with error. Any viable model of liberalism or liberal
democracy must include citizens having a degree of mutual respect
for each other as far as their joint social life is concerned. No
doubt, people do not easily combine intolerance for opposed
religious understandings with equal respect as citizens for those
who hold benighted religious beliefs. Further, those on the
receiving end of contempt for their religious faith (or lack thereof)
will not feel fully comfortable if they happen to be a small minority
that most of their fellow citizens believe is damned. But does
McConnell suppose that government tolerance alone is enough?
Does he suppose that well conceived liberalism has nothing to do
with the attitudes of fellow citizens toward each other? I should
be surprised. A well-conceived liberal democracy has some
standards (however ill-defined) for the attitudes of fellow citizens
toward each other.

III. CHURCH-STATE SEPARATION AND SCHOOLS
Finally, I address specific issues about school education. The
vast majority of people in both France and the United States
believe that public education is an important unifying force. In the
United States, many people credit public schools with creating a
modicum of national unity out of extraordinarily diverse
ingredients and with offering many youngsters an opportunity to
20

21
22

See Troper, supra note 1, at 1268.
See McConnell, supra note 2, at 1259.
Id.
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rise above the educational achievements and class status of their
parents. There is no doubt that public school education in the
United States has some serious problems, especially in inner cities;
but Americans are shortsighted indeed if they overlook all that
public education has accomplished.
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that schools
cannot teach the truth of religious, or antireligious, ideas. Religion
is a domain that is left to other sectors of society. Some have
accused the Supreme Court of encouraging a religion of
secularism. Perhaps some teachers in public schools actually tell
students that religion is foolish or unimportant; but that is rare,
and certainly not permitted under controlling constitutional
doctrine. The more realistic worry is that when a variety of
subjects, including notions of morality and justice, is presented
independently of religion, the approach implicitly teaches the
unimportance of religion. That unspoken lesson is at odds with
the understanding of those who conceive of religious truth as at
the center of most aspects of life.
This concern is legitimate, but noninvolvement by the state is
preferable to any alternative in a society as religiously divided as
ours. The worry that schools will implicitly convey the assumption
that religion is not significant can be countered to some degree by
a fairer representation of religion's crucial place in history and in
the modern life of many societies, including ours. The line
between teaching about religion and teaching religious truth is
very delicate, but attempts to observe that line respect religious
liberty more than any other approach. In his presentation at the
symposium, Professor McConnell commented that a secular
school produces young adults who inevitably think of religion as
extraneous to the real world of intellectual inquiry, if they think of
religion at all. That was not my experience, nor has it been the
experience of many others I know.
One of Professor McConnell's pleas is that students in public
schools should be free to express their own religious opinions. He
complains about "incidents in which evangelical students were
reprimanded for wearing T-shirts with religious slogans."23 Unlike
McConnell, I think students conveying religious messages in public
schools can be troublesome. Suppose a T-shirt said "Jews are
condemned to Hell." I do not think Jews, or others, should have
to study in an environment with that message staring them in the
face, and I assume McConnell agrees that such hostile messages
might be barred. Suppose the shirt says instead, "Salvation is
23

Id. at 1262.
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through Jesus Christ." That message is more positive, but a reader
may still suppose that the wearer believes that non-Christians are
not saved. A shirt that says "Jesus Loves You" or "Believe in the
Lord Jesus" has even less of a negative message for nonbelievers,
but it may still trouble non-Christians.
Where is the line to be drawn? Symbols of religious
identification-such as jewelry with a cross-should be allowed.
Messages that are bound to seriously upset students of other
beliefs should not be allowed. The difficult questions arise over
messages that are mainly attempts to persuade others to a
particular religious understanding. One view is that, unless the
offense to others is great, students should be able to communicate
what they choose about religion, and that indeed these expressions
are constitutionally protected. The contrary view is that students
should not inflict religious messages on unwilling fellows in the
nonreligious school environment. Under this view, since even
mild, positive messages by members of dominant groups may be
disconcerting for minorities, the constitutional principle of
separation allows public schools to forbid T-shirt proselytizing.
The more one thinks about this American problem, the more
sensible seems the equivocal French resolution about female
students wearing the Muslim veil: one looks in a particular case to
see whether the veil is an instrument of religious propaganda and
whether it prevents a school from functioning normally. 24
The question whether private religious schools should be
supported with state funds has arisen in both France and the
United States. Professor McConnell inverts the usual question
and asks how it is consistent with our liberal, disestablishment,
principles for the government to fund only schools owned and
controlled by the state. 25 For hospitals, adoption agencies, and
soup kitchens, religious providers should be eligible for aid along
with other private associations, but I find the issue of aid to
sectarian education much more troubling than does McConnell. 26
If sectarian schools receive substantial aid, public schools may
suffer seriously, and education will be much more fragmented.
The eventual result may be less tolerance about religious diversity,
a civic harm. Although the competing arguments about aid are
complex, substantial reasons exist not to provide heavy state
assistance to sectarian education. Not the least of these is the fact
24

25

See id.
See id. at 1262-64.

26 To be clear, I am not against religious schools. My late wife, Sanja, and I sent all of
our three children to religious schools. My present wife, Elaine Pagels, and I have one of
our two children in a religious school.
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that religion seems to flourish much more in the United States
than in European countries in which religious education receives
generous aid. Whether the reasons against aid rise to a
constitutional level is much more debatable; but I think they are
sufficient to support the Supreme Court's reluctance until now to
allow much direct financial aid to be given to religious schools.

